

Who wants to forgive and forget? Transitional justice preferences in post-war Burundi

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Abstract

Original survey data from Burundi are used to study transitional justice preferences during a democratic transition to peace after civil war. The study focuses on preferences toward *punishing* those who perpetrated human rights violations during war and *pursuing a commonly accepted truth* about such violations. The study accomplishes three things. First, it employs a specially-devised questioning method to measure the general extent of support for punishment and truth-seeking, with minimal social desirability bias. It finds that most Burundians take a moderate position on punishment and truth-seeking, contrary to claims in the advocacy literature. Second, it assesses whether support may be motivated by political tendencies, insecurity, or lack of knowledge. It finds support for all three, although the evidence speaks most clearly in favor of political motivations. Finally, the study uses a persuasion experiment to examine how responsive are people to attempts at persuading them to change their views. The results show that people are not very responsive, and that if there is any reaction, it is that people become more resolute in their position. The results suggest that the international community should proceed with caution in pursuing transitional justice measures, paying due attention to how transitional justice interventions may affect hard-won political compromises.

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Introduction

What informs public support or skepticism toward transitional justice after civil war? What are the implications for post-conflict transitional justice initiatives? To address these questions, I use original survey data from Burundi. I focus on preferences toward *punishing* those who perpetrated human rights violations during war and *pursuing a commonly accepted truth* about such violations. I examine what a specially-devised questioning method that minimizes the potential for social desirability bias reveals about general levels of support for punishment and truth-seeking. I assess whether variation in support may be motivated by political tendencies, insecurity, or lack of knowledge. Finally, I use a persuasion experiment to study how responsive are people to attempts at persuading them to change their views. Altogether, I find that support for punishment and truth-seeking is probably lower than what the advocacy literature suggests, that political tendencies likely influence expressions of support, and simple attempts at persuasion may backfire.

Transitional justice mechanisms are the subject of intense debate. Some have suggested that aggressive pursuit of transitional justice via the International Criminal Court has unduly burdened peace processes in Northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹ Controversy surrounds the use of amnesties as incentives in many peace process (Freeman, 2010). In Liberia, controversy surrounds the work of the national truth commission. When the Commission's work was done, it issued recommendations that included barring standing president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf from holding office again after her current term, causing some to conclude that the Commission had damaged the consensus needed to strengthen the rule of law (Gettleman, 2009). In Burundi, the case under consideration in this paper, there has been considerable controversy too. During

¹See the discussion in Thom et al (2008).

the peace process, United Nations representatives, non-governmental organizations, and representatives of minority-Tutsi-led opposition parties have debated vigorously with the post-war government led by the former rebel National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD, by their French acronym) over the establishment of a tribunal. The latter has insisted that a public “pardoning” process precede any tribunal, with amnesty from the tribunal being offered to those who confess and receive pardon. International observers favoring tribunals have suggested that the CNDD-FDD has been self-serving in halting an important step toward overcoming that country’s cycle of Hutu-Tutsi violence. The CNDD-FDD have rebutted such claims, suggesting that the international community is being manipulated by an opposition of displaced elites intent on shackling the popular CNDD-FDD.

The transition in Burundi, like many other contemporary transitions, is one in which belligerent parties ended their fighting under an agreement to put a democratic process into place. Such processes may fail to produce “genuine” democracies. Nonetheless, the democratic transition model is the standard that the United Nations, major western donors, and regional organizations (e.g., the European Union and African Union) have used in assisting recent war-to-peace transitions, for better or worse (Newman et al, 2009). This study contributes to our working knowledge on designing such processes, focusing on transitional justice. Arguably, preferences of citizens ought to inform judgments of how transitional justice measures should be incorporated. Victims voices may deserve the greatest weight, but opinions from non-victims also help to obtain a full picture of likely consequences of transitional justice measures. Consultation with citizens helps to ensure that the appropriate political or psychological factors are taken into account. Also, it is the citizens, not international policy-makers, who bear the costs if things go awry (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). At the same time, we might question whether a genuine canvassing of public preferences is possible after civil war. Many people may be under the duress of lingering fear. Segments of the

public may misunderstand what transitional justice processes entail. If so, then citizens may not be able to express their “real” preferences over transitional justice alternatives.

Burundi provides a useful case for studying these questions. The timing of the study was such that transitional justice questions were still open. No formal processes had been established, although there calls to do so. Thus, the study offers a glimpse at “unadulterated” transitional justice preferences in an immediate post-war context. Burundi is an important case for students of transitions from war to peace. Structurally, Burundi’s Hutu-Tutsi ethnic structure is part of the class of “ranked ethnic systems” that have provided the setting especially difficult violent conflicts (Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2006). Privilege afforded to segments of the minority Tutsi and the severe constraints to mobility for majority Hutu provide a ready narrative for ethnic mobilization that has colored Burundi’s, and neighboring Rwanda’s, violent post-independence history. Lessons from this case may be applicable to other contexts facing similar challenges.

I begin with a discussion of theories about why people may prefer punishment over forgiveness or truth-seeking over “just letting things go” after civil war. I discuss findings from the current literature, which consists mainly of surveys meant to facilitate transitional justice interventions. I explain how these may present a biased view. I follow by discussing my methodology for minimizing such bias, and I describe my survey data from Burundi. Next, I present results on general levels of support for punishment and truth-seeking. I then present findings on how political tendencies, insecurity, and lack of knowledge may affect the aggressiveness of demands for punishment or truth. Following that, I present a persuasion experiment that studied how responsive subjects’ preferences might be to attempts at persuasion. The conclusion draws out implications and proposes areas for future work.

Public expressions of transitional justice preferences

Transitional justice mechanisms are common in post-civil war contexts today, although not ubiquitous (Thoms et al, 2008). A call for such mechanisms, including calls by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Center for Transitional Justice, accompanies nearly all current peace processes. This is especially so for transitions based on negotiated settlements, most of which involve international mediation and assistance.

Transitional justice mechanisms may seek to establish a formally recognized truth about abuses. They may seek to punish human rights abusers by executing them, jailing them, or curtailing their rights to hold public offices. Transitional justice mechanisms vary in the vigor with which they pursue punishment or truth. They may also include measures for reparation.

Such mechanisms find theoretical justification in the propositions articulated in the United Nations (2004) policy document on *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*. This is a focal document for international transitional justice practitioners. Key propositions are as follows. First, punishment of abusers contributes to a norm of accountability that may prevent future abuses and provide a lesson on how scores can be settled through a legal process. Second, holding the main perpetrators accountable helps to separate them from larger groups (e.g. ethnic groups) to which they belong, opening space for moderate leaders to emerge and helping to end inter-group resentments. Third, the establishment of a formal truth makes legitimate punishment and reparations possible. Fourth, the establishment of such truth may also have a reconciliatory effect by lessening the mistrust of the abused about whether their plight will be recognized and creating an opportunity for forgiveness. Thom et al (2008) and Lie at al (2007) discussed theorized effects of transitional justice mechanisms from the social science, psychology, and legal literatures.

Pursuing transitional justice involves normative trade-offs (Bass, 2001; Kaminski et al, 2006; Lie et al, 2007; Pankhurst, 1999; Rotberg, 2000; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003; Thom et al, 2008). Opportunities to learn the truth may have to be traded off against opportunities to punish. Opportunities to contribute to norms of accountability may have to be traded off against opportunities to get belligerents to buy into a given peace process. Opportunities to establish common truths may have to be traded off against risks of exciting tensions. The sources of these trade-offs are clear. The greater the threat of punishment, the less likely will perpetrators compromise positions of power in peace negotiations, and the less likely are perpetrators and their associates to volunteer important information about what happened. In seeking a “formal” truth, one may come up against events that are highly ambiguous, and delineations of perpetrator and victim may be inciting.

In a democratic context, the citizens who hold some claim to justice due to exposure to abuses should expect to have their voices taken into account in managing these dilemmas. Among this section of the public, though, there are likely to be constituencies for and against the robust punishment or truth-seeking. Making matters more complicated, there are reasons to suspect that public expressions in *favor* of transitional justice processes may not reflect privately held beliefs about what is just. For example, support for punishment and truth-seeking may be based on agendas to undermine the political standing of those that would be targeted by such mechanisms. The ostensible *objectivity* of transitional justice processes does not imply that they are politically *neutral* in their effects. A conviction of a leader will change the political balance in a manner the disfavors the group represented by that leader.

Going in the opposite direction, expressed skepticism toward punishment or truth processes may also be based on things other than justice perceptions. Resignation of one’s “right” to pursue punishment or truth may be due to a sense of duress due to fear of imminent danger. This tendency may be reinforced by people’s sense that by voicing demands for transitional justice, they may

be creating an unwelcome disturbance. If so, the lack of demand for transitional justice measures is more the result of a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1984) or “preference falsification” (Kuran, 1998) than the expression of true desires. Then, transitional justice ideals may be worthy, but to be workable they need to be married to a strategy for ensuring security. Another “illegitimate” reason that someone may not express a demand for transitional justice could be a lack of understanding about what might be possible (Sudharshan, 2003). If so, then there is no reason to question transitional justice ideals per se; rather, there is the need to educate the public more.

Another possibility is that individuals tend to have good reason to prefer not to pursue punishment or truth. Skepticism may be a “pragmatic” response to “political realities” (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). Perhaps there are more remote concerns about reigniting conflict—not concerns expressed under duress as much as concerns expressed under acceptable conditions that are not worth undermining. Or, political and institutional changes brought about by the war may sufficiently endow former victims with a sense of empowerment and rights protection.² If so, those who were formerly vulnerable to abuse may prefer to move on. There may even be costs: pursuing punishment or truth may induce productive members of society to flee. Or, the ambiguity of past events may be such that the attempts to delineate perpetrators and victims may be tenuous at best, and may contribute on balance to undermining cooperation.

In interpreting mass data on public attitudes toward transitional justice, one cannot necessarily use responses of “for” or “against” as straightforward, context-free measures of privately held preferences. Some attention to *why* people express these positions is in order. If support constituencies are based primarily on motivations of gaining political advantage, transitional justice professionals should proceed very cautiously so as to be sure not to inadvertently undermine a hard-won political balance. Skepticism due to fear or lack of understanding would lead us to propose strategies for

²Theidon (2006) discovered that a new sense of empowerment motivated a preference for reconciliation and even forgiveness over punishment among communities in Ayaicho in in post-war Peru.

security-enhancement and education in the service of transitional justice ideals. If such illegitimate sources of skepticism are not plausible, then the onus is on transitional justice practitioners to justify transitional justice ideals before a skeptical public. The empirical analysis below examines these propositions.

Related literature

Social scientists have only recently begun to study public attitudes toward transitional justice in post-conflict settings.³ This is remarkable given the accelerated rise in resources committed to post-conflict transitional justice since the early 1990s (Thom et al, 2008). But it is also quite understandable given the logistical difficulty of sample surveys in post-conflict settings. Because of this difficulty, nearly all quantitative research in this domain has been done by researchers from a common network that links United Nations agencies, particularly offices of the United Nations Development Programme, with non-governmental organizations advocating transitional justice, including the International Center for Transitional Justice, the BBC World Trust, Search for Common Ground, and the Human Rights Center at University of California, Berkeley. Some the research is of very high quality, being submitted to rigorous peer review (e.g. Pham et al, 2004). But there is a potential conflict of interest: organizations advocating-for and depending-on the promotion of transitional justice measures have incentives to paint a picture favorable to such measures. Other work in this domain includes a survey conducted by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC, 2005) as part of national consultations on transitional justice.

Among available studies, only Pham et al (2004) study systematically potential motivations for taking more or less aggressive positions toward pursuing transitional justice. Their key explanatory variables of interest are associated with exposure to wartime traumas. They propose that trauma

³Complementing the studies on public attitudes is a literature that studies the apparent *impact* of transitional justice mechanisms. This literature has been recently reviewed in Thom et al (2008). Questions about effectiveness are not the subject of this paper.

may reduce one's sense of "self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1977) and thereby induce people to resign rights to transitional justice. They propose that this effect is mediated by whether one is psychologically resilient or succumbs to post-traumatic stress disorder. They find mixed evidence for the hypothesis. The other studies provide either basic percentages of respondents' expression one or another opinion on transitional justice measures, or at most, cross tabulations based on region, education, victim status, or gender. Table I summarizes these studies. I report modal response percentages for questions relevant to the current discussion.

The studies tend to find support for accountability measures, although the salience of transitional justice appears to be low: never was the pursuit of justice a priority over basic needs and development. The nature of the support for "accountability" is sometimes difficult to discern. In an impressive repeated cross-section study, Pham et al (2005; 2007) show that respondents in war-affected districts of Northern Uganda take opinions that would seem to contradict each other. While 66% of 2005 respondents indicated that LRA offenders should be punished, 65% reported that they would accept amnestied LRA leaders if they were to return home. The percentage of respondents indicating that LRA offenders should be tried dropped to 32% in 2007, likely due to a perception that the ICC's pursuit of LRA leader Joseph Kony derailed the peace process (Pham et al, 2007:47). In the other cases, we see more ardent support for punishment. Responses about truth-seeking tend to be more consistently in favor.

There are a few reasons to be cautious about the findings of these surveys. First, we need to be careful about generalizing. The nature of the sample universes differ from study to study, with some attempting to represent entire national populations and others limiting themselves to groups most affected by wartime violence. Second, none of the studies address in depth the types of motivations discussed above. A few of the studies report some suggestive findings. For example, Pham et al (2005) find that in Northern Uganda, respondents from non-Acholi war-affected districts

were twice as likely to prefer “peace with trials” over “peace with amnesty” as compared to those from war-affected Acholi districts. UNDP (2007) finds that in Kosovo, Kosovar Albanians are twice as likely to support the international tribunal over Kosovar Serbs. In both of these cases, ethnic markers define major political cleavages.

Third, the manner in which the issues are posed in the questionnaires may bias results in favor of pro-transitional justice responses. The questions tend to be posed in a one-sided “yes” or “no” manner, with respondents typically being asked whether they would like to have a tribunal, truth commission, or some other mechanism put in place. Respondents are not asked to choose between options presented in a more neutral manner. The psychology of survey response suggests that this may be leading. Survey respondents will respond to cues about what response is desired by those issuing the survey. Thus, respondents may be inclined to say “yes” for reasons of social desirability (Converse and Presser, 1986). An interesting exception was in Pham et al’s (2005) study in Northern Uganda, when respondents were given the choice between favoring “peace with amnesty” or “peace with trials.” On that question responses were nearly split down the middle, with 56% of respondents in Acholi districts expressing a preference for “peace with amnesty” and only 39% expressing the same in non-Acholi districts.

Finally, it is hard to say from this research how deeply held are these attitudes and how responsive they might be to events or persuasion. The Pham et al (2007) study in Northern Uganda, which updates their 2005 study, suggests that opinions may be quite responsive to events. Changes in aggregate opinions between the two surveys could reflect reactions to the controversy over Kony and the ICC. It would be useful to study such responsiveness more directly.

With survey evidence that I present below, I attempt to overcome a number of these shortcomings. I use a questioning method designed to minimize social desirability bias. I make a focused effort to study the motivations discussed above. Finally, I use a deliberation experiment to assess

the responsiveness of people's attitudes to attempts to persuade them to change their mind.

[Table I here.]

Case context

Burundi is a small, impoverished, and land-locked country of approximately 8 million people (ca. 2010) in central Africa. Like Rwanda to the north, Burundian society is marked by a caste-like stratification that has historically privileged a Tutsi minority relative to majority Hutu and a very small third group, the Twa. Like in Rwanda, Burundians have struggled to escape a conflict pitting custodians of this “ranked ethnic system” (Horowitz 1985; Lemarchand, 1970) against those ostensibly seeking to remove barriers to Hutu mobility. The country's history is marked by bouts of genocidal violence and barbarous repression. Most notable are the events of 1972, when a Hutu insurrection escalated to involve massacres of Tutsis, mostly in the southern part of the country. This triggered a massive crackdown by the Tutsi-dominated army, which went beyond restoring order and sought to prevent future uprisings by “decapitating” Hutu society. The estimated number killed in that violence—mostly Hutu, it is thought—is 150,000-200,000, with massive outflows of Hutus into neighbouring Rwanda and Tanzania (United Nations, 1996). The ensuing decades involved increasing concentration of authority in hands of the southern-Tutsi, military elite and short bouts of insurrectionist violence.

A period of liberalization in the early 1990s led to elections in 1993. These resulted in the triumph of a party that represented the aspirations of a long-oppressed Hutu majority. But under still-mysterious circumstances, members of the southern- and Tutsi-dominated army led a bungled coup attempt in October 1993 that involved the assassination of the recently-elected Hutu president. The event triggered massive violence throughout the country, and the ensuing ferment gave rise to a formidable rebellion. The fighting between the government and rebel forces was episodic over the

ensuing decade. It touched most of the country, resulting in an estimated 300,000 deaths. Major hostilities ended when the largest rebel group, the CNDD-FDD, signed onto the peace process in Pretoria in 2003. In the 2005 elections, the CNDD-FDD won an outright majority of national assembly seats (59% of 118 seats) and communal councilor posts (55% of 3,225 posts) in the 2005 elections. The CNDD-FDD's political head, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected to be president. Thus, the war resulted in a *near revolution* in the institutionalized political context relative to the pre-war status quo.

The survey interviews were conducted in Burundi in June-August 2007, two years after the elections. A small splinter from another rebel faction, the Hutu "liberationist" *Front national de liberation - Parti pour la Libration du Peuple Hutu* (FNL-PALIPEHUTU), remained at large, although this did not impede the survey.

At the time of field work, no formal transitional justice processes had been initiated. The United Nations had put forward considerations for transitional justice in Burundi as early as 1996 in a special commission report on the 1993 violence (United Nations, 1996). The commission found reason to believe that organized, genocidal Hutu-on-Tutsi violence had taken place. The commission also recognized that this episode was part of a long cycle of violence, and that any measures should take this into account. With the war raging, there was no possibility of action being taken. The conversation about truth and justice processes was confined largely to elites in Burundi's capital and donor capitals. Transitional justice measures entered the discourse again during the talks that led to the 2000 Arusha Accords. The Accords called for establishing a truth commission and a "special chamber" to try those accused of genocide. However, the CNDD-FDD were not party to the Accords. When the CNDD-FDD signed onto the peace process in 2003, its leadership suggested that questions of truth commissions and special chambers would have to be revisited after elections. As discussed in the introduction, the issue was subject to ongoing debate

between the CNDD-FDD on one side and the UN and opposition parties on the other. At the time of fieldwork, the issue of whether and how to implement transitional justice measures for Burundi remained a wide open question.

Methodology

Question design

[Figure 1 here.]

Questions about transitional justice topics are normatively loaded, and thus likely to be subject to social desirability biases unless careful attention is paid to minimizing it. To reduce the potential for such bias, I designed questions and a question-delivery approach that would create a perception of *equal social legitimacy* to alternative viewpoints. The method has two elements: wording of the choices and gestures that accompany the verbal delivery. These elements are shown in Figure 1. The wording of the questions that about preferences for *punishment* and *truth-seeking* are at the bottom of the figure. The punishment question asks the respondent about his or her preferences over three possibilities: punishing human rights violators, forgiving them unconditionally, or forgiving them only conditional on their admitting having done something wrong. Each choice is read as being favored by “some people,” cuing the respondent to appreciate that he or she would not be alone in taking any of the options. To enhance the cue, enumerators were trained to use specific physical gestures, as shown in Figure 1. The gestures allow the respondent to visualize the different groups associated with each respondent. A gestured delivery such as this also bears resemblance to everyday conversational practices among Burundians. The truth-seeking question is slightly different in its phrasing. Because truth-seeking in the Burundi context typically refers to the events of 1993 and 1972, the question asks about “what happened before the war.” The respondent is asked to express a preference for learning the truth versus “forgetting” the past. Both

of the choices have the same pre-amble, “In order to achieve peace and reconciliation...”, cuing the respondent to see either as a legitimate option for promoting these goals. The question is delivered with accompanying gestures to cue the existence of two equally legitimate options. Enumerators were trained extensively on the questioning procedure, including the precise wording and the use of gestures. The question design takes seriously the fact that a survey interview is a scripted social interaction.

Other data used below include demographic and geographic information. This information was collected in a more straightforward manner, given the non-vulnerability to social desirability bias.

Persuasion experiment design

[Figure 2 here.]

I also embedded in the survey a persuasion experiment associated with the question on punishment. The experiment was similar in design to that used by Jackman and Sniderman (2006) to study the effects of deliberative discussion on attitudes toward labor laws in France. The design of the experiment is displayed in Figure 2. Each respondent was asked the punishment question, as described above. Then, depending on the answer that was given, each respondent was randomly assigned to receive either a “vacant” or a “content-laden” counterargument. To prevent error in the implementation of the randomization process, the questionnaires were pre-printed with either the content-laden or vacant counter-arguments, and then randomly shuffled into the stacks given to the enumerators. Figure 2 shows that distributions are mostly even across the treatment conditions. By random chance, it appears that some asymmetry emerged in the shuffling of questionnaires for the counter-argument conditions for choice 3.

In order to measure the possible extent of preference falsification, I sought to measure the extent to which the counter-arguments would cause respondents to change their response. Furthermore, in order to assess the possible effectiveness of difference types of persuasion, I sought to determine

whether persuasion would be more effective in moving people toward more or less aggressive positions. Once the counter-argument was delivered, the respondent was asked again about what choice he or she preferred. The vacant counter-argument was the same for all choices. No matter what choice the respondent gave, the enumerator followed with,

Vacant counter-argument: However this can lead to some difficulties. Then I would like to ask you again. Do you think it is good to (1) punish them, (2) accept them when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?

The content-laden counter-arguments were specific to the choices that the respondent made initially. If the respondent chose option 1, to “punish”, then the enumerator would say,

Content-laden counter-argument 1: But there are people who say that both sides have committed many crimes during the war, thus it is the time for people to forgive so that we can progress. So I would like to ask you again. Do you think it is good to: (1) punish them, (2) accept them when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?

If the respondent chose option 2, to “forgive” unconditionally, then the enumerator would say,

Content-laden counter-argument 2: But if we ignore what happened people could be angry and take revenge. So I would like to ask you again. Do you think it is good to: (1) punish them, (2) accept them when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?

And finally, if the respondent chose option 3, to “forgive” only conditionally, then the enumerator would say,

Content-laden counter-argument 3: But there are some people who think that justice is not necessary, while others assert that both sides have committed many crimes and

that it is time for reconciliation. So I would like to ask you again. Do you think it is good to: (1) punish them, (2) accept them when they come back, (3) ask them to beg for forgiveness?

The different counter-arguments allow us to test the extent to which subjects might be induced to taking a more or less aggressive position. The vacant counter-arguments provide a control condition, to ensure that we do not confound persuasion with intimidation from merely receiving a counter-argument. To the extent that preference falsification is taking place in the initial responses, the experiment will help to reveal whether the falsification is masking more aggressive or more forgiving preferences.

Sample and post-stratification

The data are drawn from the multi-purpose survey of *Wartime and Postconflict Experiences in Burundi*. This survey was designed to serve multiple research purposes, including studies on the effects of economic conditions on participation in revolt and the impacts of security sector reform and ex-combatant reintegration programs.⁴ A self-weighting sample representative of the population would be most useful for the goals of the current paper. However, such a sample would not maximize power, for a given sample size, for the other studies. Thus, the sample that we drew was based on an attempt to manage these trade-offs. The sample was drawn from strata consisting of civilians, demobilized combatants, and active members of the security forces. This paper only looks at respondents from the civilian stratum, excluding any consideration of ex-combatants or current security forces members. The population of the latter are but a small fraction of the total Burundian population (less than 2%). Therefore any biases due to their exclusion should be negligible. A key compromise in our sampling plan was to set a civilian male-to-female sampling ratio of 4 to 1. The other studies were concerned mostly with those who participated in rebellion or

⁴Details on the survey and these various studies can be found at <http://www.columbia.edu/~cgs81/burundisurvey/>

army, and these were almost exclusively men. Thus, we needed a rich civilian male sample to use as our comparison group. In the event, due to non-response and random error, the male-to-female sampling ratio was a bit higher than 4-to-1, as shown in Table II.

Geographically, the sample was chosen through a multistage process. Within each of Burundi's 17 provinces, half of the province's communes were selected at random. Communes are Burundi's second tier administrative unit, and they contain between 15,000 to 100,000 individuals (or about 3,000 to 20,000 households). Sample sizes within each of the communes were determined on the basis of estimated population sizes (given in the *Institut Statistique et des Etudes Economiques du Burundi's* 2006 statistical yearbook) as well as considerations of whether that commune offered special analytical leverage for one or another of the impact studies undertaken as part of the survey. Each commune in Burundi is further divided into somewhere between 5-30 collines ("hills") of approximately equal population size and containing a few hundred households each. Within each of the selected communes, we chose as sampling sites the commune's central colline plus seven other selected at random. Then, enumerators were guided to position themselves in the middle of the colline, face a randomly pre-selected compass direction, and to approach for interview respondents nearest to the line of sight on that compass direction.

[Figure 3 here.]

The manner in which commune sample targets were set is a kind of "selecting on independent variables." This poses no special problems with respect to bias when the goal is to test hypotheses based on these independent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). However it does complicate the calculation of population-level descriptive statistics. Some kind of adjustment is needed to correct for the departures from equal probability sampling. A manner by which this can be done efficiently is weighting. One may derive adjustment weights from the sampling design or by adjusting to known population distributions (Gelman, 2007). Because our sample is not

tremendously large, and because I was able to obtain good information on demographic distributions down to the commune level, I prefer to use direct adjustment to population distributions via post-stratification. The post-strata interact commune with ethnicity (Hutu or not) and gender.⁵ The geographic locations of survey respondents is shown in Figure 3, and demographic features of the raw and weighted sample are shown in Table II.

[Table II here.]

Data analysis

All estimates are computed using the post-stratification weights described above. I adjust all variance estimates with stratification at the province level and then clustering at the commune level. The data analysis was conducted using the “svy” suite in Stata version 11.

Results

[Table III here.]

Overall preferences

The overall distribution of punishment and truth-seeking preferences is displayed in Table III. The results suggest considerable moderateness in overall preferences. The modal expressed preference is for conditional forgiveness combined with a preference to “forget the past.” The two preferences are correlated (p-value, 0.03). This is mostly with respect to the relationship between truth-seeking and the two less-aggressive punishment preferences: those who express a preference to seek the truth about the past are significantly more likely to express a preference for conditional versus un-

⁵Commune level population numbers for males and females are from the *Institut Statistique et des Etudes Economiques du Burundi*'s 2006 statistical yearbook. Commune level ethnicity proportions are from smoothed estimates that use results of our survey, as explained in Samii (Nd.). The weights were constructed by raking to gender and ethnicity proportions in each commune, using the “survey” package in R (Lumley, 2010).

conditional forgiveness. The relationship does not carry through to a preference for unconditional punishment, owing to extreme rarity of expressed preference for the latter.

The picture that these results imply is different than one of mostly staunch support in the studies reported in Table I. For example, the BBC World Services Trust/Search for Common Ground (BBCWST/SFCG) survey conducted less than a year after our survey (see row four of Table I) suggests that 68% of respondents were recorded as expressing a preference for bringing wrongdoers to trial, and 81% were recorded as expressing an opinion that a TRC would be entirely or mostly good. Those questions were asked in a yes/no format, and they did not present a set of contrasting but equally legitimate options from which to choose. We would expect that the BBCWST/SFCG survey would generate responses that veer on the side of exaggerated support, and the results are consistent with that expectation. Of course, this is only suggestive, as the BBCWST/SFCG questions referred to formal mechanisms, and we are comparing results from two separate samples. If anything, it points to need to investigate the consequences of different questioning styles within new surveys that are fielded.

Assessing motivations

To study potential motivations, I use regressions to approximate the relationships between transitional justice preferences and proxy measures of political tendencies, insecurity, and access to information.

As proxies for political tendencies, I use ethnicity, region of origin, and the interaction of the two. Before the war, elites allocated resources and opportunities on the basis of ethnic and regional identity. The Southern provinces were historically privileged in terms ties to ruling elite and access to publicly financed goods in the pre-war period (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000:381-384; Jackson, 2000:3; author's own field interviews). Generally speaking, Southern Tutsis were the most privileged. Southern Hutus received some externality benefits, but they were nonetheless subject to

the discrimination in schooling and access economic opportunities that Hutus throughout the country suffered. After the war, the ascendant CNDD-FDD has been considered among Burundians to seek to unravel Tutsi and Southern privilege. The outcome of the war thus assigns a status of political “losers” to non-Hutus and to those originating from the Southern provinces. For ethnicity, I use an indicator for whether one characterizes oneself as non-Hutu, thus being associated with those whose privileges may be threatened. For region, I use an indicator for whether one’s home region is one the Southern provinces of Bururi, Makamba, or Rutana. The south/non-south divide cross-cuts ethnicity, at times serving as a line of fracture among the predominately Hutu rebel groups as well as the Tutsi elite (International Crisis Group, 2000). I prefer to use these identity markers as measures of political tendencies rather than endogenous behaviors such as, say, vote choice in the 2005 elections. The identity markers provide a clear perspective on whether political contestation over rights and redistribution inform transitional justice preferences.⁶ In line with the discussion above about motivations, I expect that both of these indicators should be associated with more aggressive transitional justice preferences. The reason is that these indicators distinguish those who have lost more as a result of the redistribution of power that occurred after the war.

My proxies for insecurity include two measures. The first is an indicator of whether one experienced wartime victimization in terms of the death of an immediate family member at the hands of the rebels or the army. The second is an indicator for whether one’s home commune has been host to any major insecurity-related events in the three years prior to the survey. Such events are based on reports of violence associated with banditry, ongoing rebel activity, and state human rights abuses from 2004-2007.⁷ I use pre-war home commune, rather than commune of residence

⁶Ethnicity and region are highly predictive of whether a respondent indicated that they “supported” the victorious CNDD-FDD in the survey. (Asking about vote choice directly was deemed too sensitive given the context, and so we only asked about which party the respondent supported.) For non-Southern Hutu, approximately 67% are estimated to support the CNDD-FDD. Among Southern Hutu, the estimate drops to about 55%, although the difference is not statistically significant at the .10 level. For non-Southern and Southern non-Hutu, the estimated percentages are 21% and 37%, respectively.

⁷The events data were compiled from Burundian and international news sources as part of the *Wartime and Post-*

at the time of fieldwork, to address relocation due to either insecurity or economic opportunities. For those living in their home commune (about 77%), this measure captures the possibility that one faces local insecurity but is somehow means constrained in one's ability to relocate. For those who have relocated, this measure captures the fact that one may not be able to return home because of ongoing insecurity. To use a measure based on insecurity in one's current commune of residence would greatly understate the level of current insecurity. My expectations for these variables are mixed. On the one hand, victimization status is expected to increase one's desire to seek either truth or punitive measures. On the other hand, on-going insecurity is expected to have a "chilling effect", suppressing one's willingness to express one's preference for punishment or truth-seeking. Thus, I include both indicators as well as their interaction. The chilling effect hypothesis suggests that the interaction coefficient should be negative. In addition, a further implication of the political motivations hypothesis is that victimization by rebels should have a stronger association with aggressive preferences than victimization by the army.

Finally, as a proxy for one's knowledge of what transitional justice processes may entail, I use indicators for whether one's highest level of education is above primary school. The expectation here is that more education should be associated with more awareness about the possibilities for transitional justice measures, which may translate into more aggressive preferences. Summary statistics for all variables are in the appendix.

Regression specifications account for the causal ordering of explanatory factors. For example, since ethnicity is determined at birth, one should measure the "effect" of ethnicity with a specification that excludes post-birth variables to avoid "post-treatment bias" (King and Zeng, 2006).⁸ Ethnicity is then included in specifications that measure the effects of post-birth variables (e.g.,

Conflict Experiences in Burundi project (www.columbia.edu/~cgs81/burundisurvey/).

⁸There is a methodological debate over whether immutable traits like ethnicity can be analyzed in terms of "causal effects" (see, e.g., Morgan and Winship, 2007). Ethnicity is used here as a proxy for political tendencies, which are manipulable if one may redefine the conditions of privilege or deprivation associated with identity.

education), in order to reduce possible spuriousness. A similar logic is applied in specifying and interpreting all of the regression models. The appropriate coefficient to interpret substantively for each variable is the first one that appears as one goes from left to right in the regression tables.

I use ordered logistic regression for the punishment question, with outcomes ordered from (1) unconditional forgiveness to (3) unconditional punishment. I use a binary logistic regression for the truth-seeking question, with “seeking the truth” coded as 1 and “forgetting” as 0. The regression estimates use the survey weights and variance corrections accounting for stratification and clustering. This is observational data and some of the variables are endogenous to unmeasured conditions. Thus, the results only suggest causal interpretations, rather than providing clearly identified estimates of causal effects.

[Tables IV and V here.]

The regression estimates are reported in Tables IV and V. I report odds ratios for ease of interpretation. Odds ratios equal to 1 imply no relationship, larger than 1 imply more aggressive demands for punishment and truth, and between 0 and 1 imply less aggressive demands.

The “political motivations” hypothesis proposes that those who are non-Hutu and originating from a Southern province would have more aggressive preferences, and that victims of rebel violence would have more aggressive preference than of army violence. Again, the logic here is that ethnic and regional identity dominate politicians’ and their followers’ claims for how economic and political resources should be allocated, due to the legacies of Hutu and non-Southern exclusion in Burundi. Army victims are expected to have less aggressive preferences because post-war political gains by the former rebel parties has provided *political* redress. The evidence on demands for punishment are somewhat consistent with these expectations. Non-Hutu identity is associated with about 61% higher odds of choosing a more aggressive position on punishment, although contrary to expectations those with non-Hutu identity originating from the South have about 50% lower odds

of choosing a more aggressive position. With respect to victimization, we see that victimization by rebels is associated with 90% higher odds of expressing a more aggressive preference, whereas there is no association with victimization by the army. With respect to truth-seeking, non-Hutu identity is associated with 86% higher odds of expressing a preference for truth-seeking, and being from a Southern province is associated with 59% higher odds, although the latter is estimated very imprecisely (p-value, 0.20). An unexpected pattern emerges with respect to victimization, however, in that rebel victimization is actually associated with 54% lower odds of expressing a preference for truth-seeking; the opposite is true for army victimization, although this too is estimated very imprecisely. Further investigation suggests that this may be an exception that proves the rule: I fit another regression (not shown) including interaction terms between non-Hutu identity and the two victimization variables. The thought was that the negative relationship was due to *self-suppression* of demands for truth among Hutu victims of rebel violence. The estimates show that this may be the case: the interaction term coefficient almost precisely canceled out the coefficient on the rebel victimization coefficient, indicating that it is almost exclusively among *Hutu* victims of rebel violence that the negative relationship is manifest. Army victimization is estimated to be associated with 37% higher odds of expressing a preference for truth-seeking, although this is imprecise (p-value, 0.33). Finally, I fit models (not shown) that included all the specifications as in Tables IV and V, but also included an indicator variable for whether the respondent indicated that they “supported” the victorious CNDD-FDD party. Those who indicated as such had about 30% lower odds of choosing an aggressive position on punishment and about 30% lower odds of preferring truth. These results correspond to the political motivations hypothesis. However, the statistical significance of these associations dropped considerably when the non-Hutu and Southern region indicators were included, indicating high collinearity and also, in my opinion, the primacy of political identities. Thus, the bulk of the evidence is consistent with a version of the political

motivations hypothesis emphasizing ethnicity, That is, preferences for transitional justice measures appear to be based on whether such measures constrain those pursuing political agendas that disfavor one's identity group relative to helping those pursuing agendas that favor one's identity group. In Burundi, ethnic identity dominates this calculation.

The "insecurity" hypothesis proposes that on-going insecurity in one's home community is likely to suppress "rightful" demands for punishment and truth via a chilling effect on conflict victims. The evidence on this is mixed. With respect to preferences for punishment, I estimate that conditional on being a victim of rebel violence, insecurity suppresses the preference for truth-seeking by about 50%, although the estimate is highly imprecise. This chilling effect is more precisely estimated for truth-seeking: conditional on being a victim of rebel violence, insecurity reduces the odds of expressing a demand for truth by about 30%. Such effects are not evident with respect to army victimization: preferences for both punishment and truth-seeking are estimated to be higher for army victims facing insecurity. Thus, we find that the evidence is consistent with this hypothesis only for the subset of individuals having been exposed to victimization by rebels. Those for whom this combination of conditions apply constitute only an estimated 7% (s.e., 2) of the population under study. Thus, while the insecurity motivation is a possibly important reason for non-aggressiveness at the individual level, it cannot explain much of the overall non-aggressiveness that I have recorded.

The "knowledge" hypothesis proposes that aggressive of transitional justice demands should be increasing in education. This hypothesis receives no support with respect to punishment: the odds ratio is almost exactly one. However, it receives strong support with respect to truth-seeking: those with greater than primary education have more than double (2.33) the odds expressing a preference for truth-seeking. The finding may reflect the fact that transitional justice is not all or nothing: individuals may prefer a process that seeks truth but not necessarily punishment.⁹

⁹The CNDD-FDD support indicator was also collinear with the higher education variable, although when the

Persuasion experiment

The persuasion experiment studies (1) how responsive are people in general to counter-arguments and (2) whether attempts at persuasion are more effective in pushing individuals toward more aggressive or less aggressive stances. The latter is especially important given the political nature of transitional justice interventions. In a democratic context, those who stand to lose politically from the advance of transitional justice mechanisms would likely try to persuade the public to resign demands for punishment or truth-seeking.¹⁰ On the other hand, principled advocates of transitional justice processes, along with those who stand to gain politically, would pose arguments persuading people to support more aggressive positions.

[Table VI here.]

The persuasion experiment was limited to preferences for punishment. Survey-weighted results are presented in Table VI. The tables show row proportions—that is, proportions choosing any one of the three preference options under the vacant and content-laden counter-argument conditions. Outcome tables for each of the subgroups is displayed separately. Recall respondents first placed themselves into a subgroup through their initial response to the punishment question. Then, respondents were randomly assigned to receive either the vacant or content-laden counter-argument. Overall, attempts at persuasion were usually unsuccessful. Responses remain stable at least 75% of the time across the groups and treatment conditions. Surprisingly, the effect of the content-laden counter-arguments were to make those who took positions at the extreme ends of the choice spectrum *more resolved* to maintain their position. This is evident among those who initially express a preference for unconditional forgiveness: whereas under the control condition, responses remain

support indicator was included, results did not change appreciably for the coefficient on the higher education variable.

¹⁰As discussed in the context section above, this has been the case in Burundi, where the dominant and former insurgent CNDD-FDD party has issued statements suggesting that the priority should be in promoting “pardon” rather than looking into the abuses that occurred during wartime.

the same 77% of the time, the rate increases to 83% under the persuasion condition. The difference is even greater for those whose initial response is unconditional punishment: the rate at which people maintain their initial response goes from 75% in the control condition to 88% in the treatment condition. However, in the latter case we must note that the subgroup sample is quite small. For those taking the moderate “conditional forgiveness” position, the differences are negligible.

Thus, expressed preferences are not so responsive to attempts to change them. In assessing whether persuasion tends to work more in moving people toward more or less aggressive positions, it would seem that it slightly favors aggressive positions, but not because of persuasion effects. Rather, the bias in favor of aggressive positions is due to an effect of making people more *resolute* in maintaining an aggressive position. The implication is that simple attempts at persuasion may backfire, possibility contributing to polarization. Any attempt at a deliberation or sensitization intervention should be sensitive to such possibilities.

Conclusion

This paper accomplishes three tasks. First, it uses a questioning method that tries to minimize social desirability bias in eliciting expressed preferences over transitional justice options. The results were as expected: expressed preferences were less aggressively in favor of punishment and truth-seeking than has been found in a number of recent surveys. Of course, this does not provide definitive evidence of bias in past surveys. Doing so would require randomly assigning different questioning methods in the context of one survey, and doing this on numerous populations. This ought to be the subject of further work for transitional justice survey researchers. Nonetheless, the results from this study raise the question of whether the apparently ardent support for transitional justice interventions suggested by recent surveys are an artifact of the questioning method.

Second, I tested propositions about whether differences in people’s expressed preferences for

transitional justice options are motivated by differences in political tendencies, levels of insecurity, or levels of knowledge. I find some degree of support for each of these propositions, although the political tendencies hypothesis is most strongly corroborated, particularly with reference to the role of ethnic identity in Burundi's post-war politics. The knowledge proposition finds support only with reference to truth-seeking.

Third, I used an experiment embedded in the survey to study whether expressed preferences were responsive to a simple attempt persuasion. For the most part, it seems not. There was little switching of expressed preferences, and the only clear effects was to make *more resolved* those who take more extreme positions—whether in favor unconditional pardon or unconditional punishment.

These findings suggest that transitional justice interventions ought to be pursued with considerable caution. Gauging support for transitional justice interventions should use methods that aim to elicit preferences with minimal bias. Such has not been the case thus far, in my opinion. Those advocating for transitional justice processes should be deeply aware of how support for such interventions may be based on political calculations as much as principled justice considerations. On the basis of this study, the influence of political calculations appears to apply to both victims and non-victims alike. Given the evidence for the political tendencies hypothesis, those assessing transitional justice needs should also proceed with caution in collecting information on the human rights violations. If the collection of such data is known to anticipate the establishment of punitive mechanisms, then the types of political calculations considered here may affect who comes forward to register abuses. Finally, attempts at persuasion have the potential to backfire, making people more resolute rather than more willing to entertain alternatives. More work should be done on this phenomenon to ensure that deliberation and sensitization interventions do not contribute to polarization.

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Biographical statement

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Tables

Table I: Mass surveys on transitional justice attitudes

Authors	Pub. year	Location	Pop.	Research year	Sample size	Sampling method	Percent stating justice top priority	Modal responses to questions about TJ processes		
								General accountability	Punishment	Truth
AHRC	2005	Afghanistan	Adults nationwide	2004	4,151	Enumerator discretion in designated locations with preset criteria	4% say rule of law is top priority.	49%: justice means legal punishment. 76%: justice very important.	76%: punishment of war criminals contributes to security. 28%: only serious offenders and commanders should be tried. 61%: reject amnesty of war criminals.	95%: important to establish record of truth. 23%: Govt should take lead in establishing record.
BBCWS T & SFCG	2007	Liberia	Adults in 8 of 15 counties	2007	1,600	Villages/towns selected to reflect diversity, particularly ethnic diversity. Households selected by enumerators quasi-randomly within villages/towns. Stratification by gender.	29% mention access to courts as one among a number of priorities.		92%: recall human rights abuses during wartime. 50%: respondents who could recall abuses thought that abusers should go to trial. 60%: commanders or faction leaders should be tried. 42%: of those aware of TRC thought it should use amnesty power. 44%: of those aware of TRC thought it should not use prosecutorial power.	79%: aware of TRC. 56%: of those aware of TRC think its contribution to reconciliation good or excellent. 46%: of those aware of TRC think its contribution to truth has been good or excellent. 36%: of those aware of TRC think its contribution to accurate account has been good or excellent.
BBCWS T & SFCG	2008	Burundi	Adults in 10 out of 17 provinces	2008	1,648	Communities selected to reflect diversity. Households selected by enumerator quasi-randomly within communities. Stratified by age group.	19% mention trying human rights offenders and 11% mention establishing truth as one among a number of priorities.	36%: Justice means fair treatment.	68%: wrongdoers should be brought to trial. 48%: aware of proposals for special court.	68%: aware of proposal for TRC. 81%: think TRC would be entirely or mostly good. 59%: of those thinking TRC good say it's because of reconciliation.
Pham et al	2004	Rwanda	Adults in 4 of 154 communes	2002	2,091	Communities selected to reflect diversity. Respondents selected randomly within communes.			42%: support international tribunal. 68%: support domestic trials. 91%: support gacaca.	
Pham et al	2005	Northern Uganda	Adults in 4 highly war-exposed districts.	2005	2,585	Districts selected based on high conflict exposure, and ethnic and language diversity. IDP camps and other sites stratified by urbanness selected in districts. Respondents selected randomly within sites/camps.	Less than 1% saying justice is a concern over other development/security priorities.	31%: justice means trials. 76%: LRA human rights abusers should be held accountable. 76%: UPDF human rights abusers should be held accountable. 58%: lower level LRA offenders should not be held accountable.	66%: LRA rights offenders should be tried and punished. 51%: UPDF rights offenders should be tried and punished. 53-80%: rights offenders should have amnesty. 65%: accept amnestied LRA leaders if they returned home. 79%: accept amnestied low level LRA if they returned home. 56%: Require amnestied LRA to apologize for forgiveness 56% vs. 39%: peace with amnesty preferred to peace with trials, in Acholi vs. non-Acholi districts.	92%: truth telling process needed in Northern Uganda.
Pham et al	2007	Northern Uganda	Adults in 8 highly war-exposed districts.	2007	2,875	Districts selected based on high conflict exposure, and ethnic and language diversity. IDP camps and other sites stratified by urbanness selected in districts. Respondents selected randomly within sites/camps.	3% say justice is top priority.	41%: justice is being fair 33%: prevent future conflict by pardoning LRA leaders 70%: important to hold human rights offenders accountable 50%: hold LRA leaders accountable 48%: hold all LRA accountable 40%: hold government accountable 18%: hold UPDF accountable.	32%: LRA rights offenders should be tried and punished. 55%: UPDF rights offenders should be tried and punished. 59%: agree important to have trials for LRA leaders 34%: important to have trials for lower ranking LRA 78%: lower level LRA should be pardoned 80%: peace with amnesty preferred to peace with trials	95%: establish written record. 90%: establish truth commission.
UNDP	2007	Kosovo	Adults in	2007	1,250	Stratification on demographic, geographic, and ethnic features. Individual selection method unclear.			36-70%: satisfaction with ICTY for K-Serbs vs. Albanians 90%: punishment of perpetrators crucial element of justice	86-83%: believe establishing trust is important for K-Albanians vs K-Serbs
Vinck et al	2008	Eastern DRC	Adults in areas most affected by war: Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu districts.	2007	2,620	Communities and individuals randomly selected.	3% say justice is top priority.	85%: important to hold offenders accountable. 82%: accountability necessary to secure peace. 51%: justice means establishing truth.	69%: war criminals should be punished. 38%: foot soldiers should be treated the same as leaders.	88%: important to know the truth about what happened. 56% - 24%: establish truth via judiciary vs. truth commission.

Table II: Demographic characteristics of sample

Demographic category	Raw sample %	Weighted sample %
Gender:		
Men	86%	47%
Women	14%	53%
Ethnicity		
Hutu	71%	74%
Tutsi	28%	25%
Other	1%	1%
Highest level of education		
Primary not completed	43%	46%
Primary	37%	35%
Junior secondary	11%	11%
Senior secondary	7%	7%
University+	2%	1%
Sample total: 1,169 civilians		

Note: The male-female ratio was by design. Refer to the text.

Table III: Overall preference distribution

	Unconditional forgiveness	Conditional forgiveness	Unconditional punishment	Total
Seek truth about past	7% (1)	22% (2)	2% (1)	31% (3)
Forget the past	28% (3)	39% (3)	3% (1)	69% (3)
Total	34% (3)	60% (3)	5% (1)	
Cell proportions displayed. <i>N</i> = 1151 Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses. Rao-Scott <i>F</i> , 3.97; p-value, 0.03.				

Note: The data contained missing values for seven respondents on the punishment question and 14 respondents on the truth question. These were simply omitted.

Table IV: Ordered logistic regression of preference for punishment, odds ratio estimates

Variable		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Hutu	<i>OR</i>	1.61	2.00	1.95	1.69	1.60
	<i>(s.e.)</i>	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.43)
	<i>p-val</i>	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.09
Southern province	<i>OR</i>		1.01	1.02	0.94	0.91
	<i>(s.e.)</i>		(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.25)
	<i>p-val</i>		0.95	0.95	0.81	0.74
Non-Hutu X South.	<i>OR</i>		0.26	0.25	0.3	0.31
	<i>(s.e.)</i>		(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.23)
	<i>p-val</i>		0.09	0.08	0.12	0.13
Higher education	<i>OR</i>			1.09	1.05	1.09
	<i>(s.e.)</i>			(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.31)
	<i>p-val</i>			0.76	0.86	0.78
Rebel victimization	<i>OR</i>				1.89	2.27
	<i>(s.e.)</i>				(0.49)	(0.67)
	<i>p-val</i>				0.02	0.01
Army victimization	<i>OR</i>				1.04	0.9
	<i>(s.e.)</i>				(0.27)	(0.31)
	<i>p-val</i>				0.88	0.76
Insecurity	<i>OR</i>					0.92
	<i>(s.e.)</i>					(0.34)
	<i>p-val</i>					0.83
Insecurity X Rebel vict.	<i>OR</i>					0.55
	<i>(s.e.)</i>					(0.34)
	<i>p-val</i>					0.34
Insecurity X Army vict.	<i>OR</i>					1.59
	<i>(s.e.)</i>					(0.89)
	<i>p-val</i>					0.41
<i>N</i>		1162	1162	1162	1162	1162
<i>Global F-test p-val.</i>		0.07	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.17

Note: “OR” refers to “odds ratio.” Standard errors are on the odds ratio scale, accounting for stratification at the province level and clustering at the commune level. The data contained missing values for seven respondents. These were omitted.

Table V: Logistic regression of preference for truth-seeking, odds ratio estimates

Variable		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Hutu	<i>OR</i>	1.86	1.87	1.53	2.10	1.94
	<i>(s.e.)</i>	(.47)	(.54)	(.45)	(.64)	(0.56)
	<i>p-val</i>	0.02	0.04	0.15	0.02	0.03
Southern province	<i>OR</i>		1.59	1.66	1.95	1.93
	<i>(s.e.)</i>		(0.58)	(.63)	(.71)	(0.74)
	<i>p-val</i>		0.20	0.19	0.07	0.09
Non-Hutu X South.	<i>OR</i>		1.03	0.88	0.68	0.70
	<i>(s.e.)</i>		(.53)	(.46)	(.32)	(0.35)
	<i>p-val</i>		0.95	0.81	0.42	0.47
Higher education	<i>OR</i>			2.33	2.47	2.55
	<i>(s.e.)</i>			(.60)	(.63)	(0.63)
	<i>p-val</i>			0.00	0.00	0.00
Rebel victimization	<i>OR</i>				0.46	0.61
	<i>(s.e.)</i>				(.13)	(0.21)
	<i>p-val</i>				0.01	0.16
Army victimization	<i>OR</i>				1.37	1.20
	<i>(s.e.)</i>				(.43)	(0.34)
	<i>p-val</i>				0.33	0.52
Insecurity	<i>OR</i>					1.98
	<i>(s.e.)</i>					(0.67)
	<i>p-val</i>					0.05
Insecurity X Rebel vict.	<i>OR</i>					0.35
	<i>(s.e.)</i>					(0.19)
	<i>p-val</i>					0.06
Insecurity X Army vict.	<i>OR</i>					1.11
	<i>(s.e.)</i>					(0.71)
	<i>p-val</i>					0.87
<i>N</i>		1155	1155	1155	1155	1155
<i>Global F-test p-val.</i>		0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: “OR” refers to “odds ratio.” Standard errors are on the odds ratio scale, accounting for stratification at the province level and clustering at the commune level. The data contained missing values for seven respondents. These were simply omitted.

Table VI: Persuasion experiment results


Initial response: Unconditional forgiveness			
	Unconditional forgiveness	Conditional forgiveness	Unconditional punishment
Vacant counter-argument	76.7% (4.6)	18.7% (3.9)	4.6% (4.4)
Content-laden counter-argument	83.1% (4.0)	16.8% (4.0)	0.1% (0.1)
Total	79.9% (3.3)	17.8% (3.0)	2.4% (2.2)
Row proportions displayed. Subgroup $N = 404$ Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses. Rao-Scott F , 4.28; p-value, 0.03			

Initial response: Conditional forgiveness			
	Unconditional forgiveness	Conditional forgiveness	Unconditional punishment
Vacant counter-argument	6.5% (2.9)	88.1% (3.7)	5.4% (2.6)
Content-laden counter-argument	9.4% (2.9)	84.1% (3.8)	6.5% (2.8)
Total	7.9% (2.1)	86.1% (3.0)	6.0% (2.4)
Row proportions displayed. Subgroup $N = 664$ Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses. Rao-Scott F , 0.40; p-value, 0.65			

Initial response: Unconditional punishment			
	Unconditional forgiveness	Conditional forgiveness	Unconditional punishment
Vacant counter-argument	0.3% (0.3)	24.5% (11.7)	75.2% (11.7)
Content-laden counter-argument	0.0% (0.0)	2.4% (1.7)	97.7% (1.7)
Total	0.1% (0.1)	12.2% (5.8)	87.7% (5.9)
Row proportions displayed. Subgroup $N = 78$ Percentage point standard errors are shown in parentheses. Rao-Scott F , 10.20; p-value, 0.00			

Figures

Figure 1: Gestures accompanying question delivery



Punishment question:

Gesture 1. Some people say that former combatants who killed civilians or raped women should not be accepted in their home communities in any case and they should be punished [choice 1].

Gesture 2. Some other people say that they should be accepted and what happened should be forgotten [choice 2].

Gesture 3. A third group says that they could be accepted if they beg for forgiveness [choice 3].

Gesture 4. Which one of the three groups do you support?

Truth-seeking question:

Of the following options, which is close to your point of view?

Gesture 1: In order to achieve peace and reconciliation, it is necessary to know the truth about what happened before the war [choice 1].

Gesture 2: In order to achieve peace and reconciliation, it is good to forget about the past [choice 2].

Figure 2: Persuasion experiment design and treatment group sizes





Figure 3: Geographic locations of survey respondents



Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Wgtd. Mean ^a	S.D.	Possible values	N
Punishment:				1,2,3	1162
i. Uncond forgive	0.36 ^b	0.34 ^b			
ii. Cond forgive	0.56 ^b	0.60 ^b			
iii. Uncond punish	0.07 ^b	0.05 ^b			
Seek truth	0.39	0.31	0.49	0,1	1155
Non-Hutu	0.29	0.26	0.45	0,1	1169
Southern	0.19	0.15	0.39	0,1	1169
Non-Hutu X Southern	0.05	0.0	0.22	0,1	1169
Higher ed.	0.31	0.29	0.46	0,1	1169
Victim. Reb.	0.22	0.26	0.42	0,1	1169
Victim. FAB	0.24	0.23	0.43	0,1	1169
Insecurity	0.28	0.26	0.45	0,1	1169
InsecurityXVictim. Reb.	0.06	0.07	0.24	0,1	1169
InsecurityXVictim. FAB	0.09	0.09	0.29	0,1	1169

^aMean with survey weights applied.

^bProportions for the punishment preference variable.